報(bào)告題目：競(jìng)合供應(yīng)鏈中的技術(shù)依存和生產(chǎn)時(shí)序決策研究 2020-11-16

題目：競(jìng)合供應(yīng)鏈中的技術(shù)依存和生產(chǎn)時(shí)序決策研究（Technology Specifications and Production Timing in a Co-Opetitive Supply Chain）

主講人：牛保莊華南理工大學(xué)教授

時(shí)間：11月20日（周五）下午15：00-16：30

地點(diǎn)：bwin必贏唯一官網(wǎng)311會(huì)議室

會(huì)議同步線上直播，會(huì)議號(hào)：406 645 606

密碼：202011

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報(bào)告摘要：

本文刻畫(huà)的是中國(guó)代工企業(yè)推出自主品牌產(chǎn)品時(shí)，自主創(chuàng)新程度以及帶來(lái)的消費(fèi)者需求不確定性風(fēng)險(xiǎn)之間的權(quán)衡。在該代工企業(yè)和它服務(wù)的品牌商形成的的競(jìng)合供應(yīng)鏈中，以生產(chǎn)時(shí)間決策為關(guān)鍵決策，本文重點(diǎn)刻畫(huà)了在自主創(chuàng)新需求波動(dòng)較大情形下，代工商與品牌商如何共生共贏的可行區(qū)間。研究發(fā)現(xiàn)，由于存在合作-競(jìng)爭(zhēng)的關(guān)系，推遲生產(chǎn)策略（PS）并不總是使代工企業(yè)或品牌商受益。企業(yè)對(duì)生產(chǎn)時(shí)間的決策取決于其自主創(chuàng)新產(chǎn)品的市場(chǎng)需求不確定性程度和成品市場(chǎng)上的競(jìng)爭(zhēng)激烈強(qiáng)度。當(dāng)需求不確定性很高時(shí)，兩家公司都選擇事后生產(chǎn)策略（PS）；當(dāng)需求不確定性為中等或低時(shí)，只有其中一家選擇事后生產(chǎn)策略（PS）。有趣的是，當(dāng)成品市場(chǎng)競(jìng)爭(zhēng)激烈時(shí)，代工商傾向于選擇事后生產(chǎn)策略（PS），這種策略可以使它解決市場(chǎng)需求不確定性，獲得信息價(jià)值，并通過(guò)溢出效應(yīng)從品牌商的先動(dòng)優(yōu)勢(shì)中受益。

Motivated by Google’s technology regulation practice in Android device industry, we consider firms’ decisions on production timing in a co-opetitive supply chain comprising a manufacturer and an original equipment manufacturer (OEM), where the manufacturer acts as the OEM’s upstream contract manufacturer and downstream competitor. Demand is uncertain, and depends on the market acceptance of product features and design. If a firm decides to implement ex-post production strategy (PS), it can delay the production until the market acceptance of its product is realized. Otherwise, ex-ante production strategy (AS) is implemented and the early commitment value is enjoyed. We find that, in the co-opetive supply chain, PS does not always benefit either the manufacturer or the OEM, because the value of market acceptance realization is diminished by competition and the effect of early commitment under AS. Further, firms’ decisions on production timing are influenced by their market acceptance uncertainty (MAU), which can be low if the product design fits the customers’ expectation well. Both firms choose PS when they are at the risk of high MAU, while only one of them chooses PS when their MAU are moderate or high. Interestingly, when the competition is intense, the manufacturer tends to choose PS, because it can benefit from both the realized market acceptance and OEM’s early commitment.

主講人簡(jiǎn)介：

牛保莊，華南理工大學(xué)教授，博導(dǎo)，教育部青年長(zhǎng)江學(xué)者(2017)，國(guó)家優(yōu)青（2018）。廣東省政協(xié)委員。研究話題為中國(guó)合同制造創(chuàng)牌增值情景下的供應(yīng)鏈競(jìng)合管理。目前已在運(yùn)營(yíng)管理領(lǐng)域發(fā)表頂級(jí)期刊論文10篇，包括MSOM 2篇，POM 5篇，TRB 3篇，另有38篇文章發(fā)表在EJOR, Omega等知名期刊。獲第八屆中國(guó)高等學(xué)?？茖W(xué)研究?jī)?yōu)秀成果獎(jiǎng)（人文社會(huì)科學(xué)）二等獎(jiǎng)、中國(guó)管理學(xué)青年獎(jiǎng)，廣東省哲學(xué)社會(huì)科學(xué)優(yōu)秀成果二等獎(jiǎng)、三等獎(jiǎng)，中國(guó)決策科學(xué)“青年科技獎(jiǎng)”等多個(gè)獎(jiǎng)項(xiàng)。培養(yǎng)的博士生畢業(yè)獲聘海外名校教職，為華南地區(qū)首次。